Introduction/Motivation
This paper contributes to the discussion of whether large banks are subject to adequate market discipline or enjoy a "too-big-to-fail" subsidy in credit markets as a result of perceptions of potential government support. During the most recent financial crisis and in several prior episodes, the U.S. and other governments have rescued large financial institutions to avoid the financial instability they feared would result from the failure of those firms. Market participants may continue to evaluate certain large financial institutions based on the belief that the government would provide support to those institutions in a crisis, as opposed to evaluating them on the basis of their stand-alone credit risk.
A number of previous studies have used market data to evaluate creditors' perceptions that a company is too big to fail. This paper uses credit default swap (CDS) data. Arguably, this is a more transparent metric of the credit spreads banks face than deposit costs (see Jacewitz and Pogach, 2013 or Bassett, 2014) , which can have fees or other terms that complicate cross-bank comparisons, or bond spreads (Santos, 2013 and GAO, 2014) , which often contain call provisions. In theory, if market participants deemed a large bank too big to fail, the bank's CDS spread would trade tighter than suggested by its fundamental credit risk. The bank would, as a result, experience lower CDS spreads than financial institutions market participants did not view as too big to fail.
Efforts to identify the possible impact of the too-big-to-fail perception on banks' borrowing costs face several challenges. Borrowing costs reflect idiosyncratic credit risk of individual banks and liquidity differences in firms' borrowings. Volz et al. (2011) use CDS data from Bloomberg for an international sample of 91 banks, including U.S. banks, coupled with expected default frequencies from Moody's KMV (now Moody's Credit Edge) data to control for credit risk. Volz et al. control for liquidity differences using bid-ask spreads. They examine the impact of size, measured as market capitalization plus the book value of liabilities and data on total assets and find evidence consistent with a too-big-to-fail subsidy. Although the authors consider multiple measures of size and data providers, they only consider asset size as a linear variable and do not examine asset-size thresholds. This paper, on the other hand, uses dummy variables at various asset size cut-offs and compares them with models using different asset size cut-offs (threshold effects), along with the dollar value of assets (continuous effects). Ahmed et al. (2014) use CDS data from Markit (the same source for this paper's CDS data) for a sample of 20 U.S. banks, as well as U.S. firms from other industries, and control for credit risk using expected default frequencies from Moody's Credit Edge and for liquidity using Markit's CDS depth measure (one of three CDS liquidity measures rolled into the Markit liquidity score used in this paper).
Markit compiles its CDS data from the single name reference entity of the CDS transaction and creates a liquidity rating based on factors detailed in the data section of this paper. The authors also make use of corporate bond data from the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) reporting system of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority to consider too-big-to-fail effects in the pricing of executed bond trades. For CDS and bonds, the authors consider size as a linear variable, i.e., the log of the asset size of a firm as opposed to evaluating whether an asset-size threshold effect exists.
1 Ahmed et al. offer economies of scale as an alternative explanation of why a firm's asset size affects its observed CDS spreads. Their argument is that larger firms are more profitable and consequently less likely to default.
However, it could be argued that market participants' view of the benefits of economies of scale on profitability is already taken into account by Moody's Credit Edge, the credit control variable that Ahmed et al. use , since that variable incorporates measures of profitability and also makes use of stock price data (which presumably would "price-in" such economies of scale).
Previous papers on this subject have sought to measure time-variation in large banks' funding advantages or to quantify the value of the taxpayer subsidy. This paper takes a different approach. We 1 Additionally, expected default frequency (EDF) has a nonlinear relationship with observed CDS spreads, making it difficult to draw economic significance from the model's coefficients. For example, industries with a low median EDF may have observed CDS spreads that are less affected by a small change in EDF when compared to industries with a higher median EDF. According to the paper, the mean EDF for banks in the sample is the fourth highest of the 14 industries considered. seek to identify where a possible too-big-to-fail effect for banks may be most in evidence by testing alternative specifications of size and systemic importance. Specifically, we consider whether market participants allow firms to borrow at a lower cost based on various asset-size thresholds or whether those firms have been designated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as globally systemically important banks (or G-SIBs). 2 We focus on asset-size thresholds and the G-SIB designation because regulators have used both types of measures to set heightened levels of prudential regulation.
The paper approaches the analysis in two steps.
First, the paper tests two different alternative controls for credit risk before considering whether size appears to influence a bank's CDS spread. Each of the credit control variables is commonly used by market participants. Several papers use Moody's Credit Edge to control for credit risk (Volz et al., 2011 and Ahmed et al., 2014) ; other papers use controls for credit risk that reflect the authors' own perceptions of drivers of credit fundamentals (GAO, 2014) . This paper selects the best fitting commercial credit model from two alternative models and then approaches the too-big-to-fail question.
With regards to controls for liquidity, papers use different control variables depending on the type of bank liability they are assessing. Papers considering deposits use deposit volumes while papers evaluating bond spreads use bid-ask spreads (GAO, Santos) to control for differences in liquidity across banks' liabilities. Other papers on CDS have used bid-ask spreads (Volz) or depth, i.e., the number of dealers quoting (Ahmed) . This paper uses Markit's CDS liquidity score, which is a multifaceted measure that reflects: 1) the freshness of the quote, 2) depth of the market, and 3) the bid-ask spread. These refinements still yield results consistent with a number of other studies' findings that suggest a possible funding advantage for large banks.
The too-big-to-fail subsidy may be relevant to the policy discussion on appropriate asset-size thresholds for heightened prudential regulation. holding companies with at least $50 billion in assets prudential standards that "are more stringent" than generally applicable standards and that "increase in stringency" be based on a variety of factors related to the systemic importance of these institutions. Among other things, the Dodd-Frank Act also requires that banks with assets greater than $50 billion be subject to ex-post assessments in the event of taxpayer losses as a result of resolution of a firm under Title II of the Act. After the failures or nearfailures of many large institutions during the financial crisis, legislation and regulation sought to make larger firms more safe and sound through heightened prudential standards, including higher capital and liquidity requirements. The higher standards attempt to ensure that these companies have sufficient capital and liquidity to weather a crisis, and they seek to promote market discipline by making it less likely that a large firm would need to be rescued. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, supervisory standards begin to increase at $50 billion in assets and become significantly more rigorous as companies become larger and more complex.
Based on analysis of market pricing, market participants appear to be offering cheaper funding to banks with assets above a certain threshold, which could encourage greater risk taking among these firms. We believe that this paper is unique in offering an analytic contribution to the policy discussion of the appropriate cut-off for heightened prudential regulation as it considers multiple asset-size thresholds and finds that using asset-size thresholds in the $50 billion to $150 billion range have the largest coefficients and best model fit for a too-big-to-fail effect. By contrast, models with asset-size thresholds at $200 billion or above are less effective at explaining banks' CDS spreads. Prior work in this area has considered too big to fail only as a linear function of bank size, but this paper explores too big 4 to fail as a linear function and a threshold effect. We recognize that CDS spreads are but one way of measuring the too-big-to-fail subsidy and hope that this paper inspires further analytic work on where the too-big-to-fail threshold seems most material to better inform regulatory policy development.
Although this paper contributes to the discussion of the appropriate cutoff for heightened prudential regulation of banks, evidence of a too-big-to-fail subsidy is only one of a number of relevant policy considerations. Other relevant considerations could include the data used in the Basel methodology for establishing the G-SIB systemic importance scores 4 See OFR working paper "A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics" for a discussion of these metrics. 5 None of the models use observed CDS spreads as an input to estimate implied CDS spreads.
5 liquidity score for single-name CDS, a metric that began in April 2010. However, not all of the raw data we used are reported monthly. For daily data, we used the first data point available for the month, since monthly data generally reflects the first day of the month. For data available only quarterly or biannually, such as asset size, we repeated the available data for each month in the reported period.
Dependent Variable
Credit Default Swap Spread (y) -These data were retrieved from Markit, are available at a daily frequency, and are based on a collection of transactions and dealer quotes for the reference entity. The CDS spreads in this study are based on the single name reference entity of the CDS transaction. The data are recorded in percentages, so a regression coefficient of 1.30 represents 1.30 percent, or 130 bps.
Five-year CDS spread data was chosen because it is the most liquid of the spread tenors and contains the most robust data. The CDS contracts are all quoted in U.S. dollars to avoid exchange rate challenges.
Additionally, only spreads on senior CDS were used in this study. Lastly, restructuring clauses were streamlined by using the prevailing standards established by each country's regulatory regime. Variation in restructuring clauses is controlled for in the models through right-hand geographic variables. Each of these restrictions on the data set is meant to reduce the noisiness of the data and isolate the possible too-big-to-fail variables this paper is interested in investigating. Assets > $50B … Assets > $250B -These asset labels were assigned to explore potential too-big-to-fail threshold effects. They are binary dummy variables, for example, the "Assets > $50B" assigns a 0 for all banks with assets equal or less than $50 billion and a 1 to all banks with assets greater than $50 billion.
Independent Variables G-SIB(0,1), G-SIB(cap add-on) -The global systemically important bank (G-SIB) designation is
Data on total assets was gathered from Bloomberg and, for non-U.S. institutions, converted into U.S.
dollars using that period's exchange rate.
Liquidity Fixed Effects -Markit places a liquidity score on individual CDS contracts on a one-to-five scale, one being the most liquid. The liquidity score is assigned based on three factors: bid-ask spread, market depth, and data freshness. Each category has a number of demerits that raise the liquidity score of the entity. Factor 1 is bid-ask spread with a maximum of five demerits. The tightest bid-ask spreads have no demerits while the widest spreads have five demerits. Factor 2 is market depth with a maximum of four demerits. According to Markit, "[d] In this section of the paper, two separate methods are used to overcome heteroskedasticity.
The first method adds a robust option to the initial regression. The robust option chosen uses HuberWhite sandwich estimators to estimate standard errors. This is commonly used as a minor correction for heteroskedasticity by producing estimators for ordinary data using stratified cluster sampling. The results of the robust regression follow in table 1.2. The regressions were reestimated clustering the banks by name to check for the presence of auto-correlation. These results are shown in Appendix A and do not alter the conclusions presented in the main text. The time and geographical controls vary in significance as the right-hand-side variables are adjusted while the liquidity control remains constant throughout each regression. Bloomberg and Moody's are each significant at the 99 percent level when the basic set of controls is applied. To reveal which model has the most explanatory power, R-squared is used. In this model, Bloomberg has the most explanatory power with an R-squared of 91.8 percent while Moody's has an R-squared of 69.6 percent.
Following is a scatterplot of the relationship between the Markit five-year CDS spread and Bloomberg's five-year estimated CDS spread. 
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Bloomberg Five-year Estimated CDS Spread Bloomberg and Moody's are each significant at the 99 percent level when the basic set of controls is applied. To reveal which variable has the most explanatory power in this model, Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) is used. BIC uses a likelihood function to determine the strength of a model.
Lower BIC scores indicate a better fit model. To reach a BIC score within the GLS framework, the heteroskedasticity correction needed to be relaxed and the standard GLS autocorrelation model needed to be used. The BIC results of the robust OLS regression reinforce the finding that the model using Bloomberg's implied CDS spreads has the best fit.
The following graphs visually compare the models over time for two large U.S. banks. The charts illustrate the results of the GLS regression. The Bloomberg model, for the most part, appears to follow observed CDS spreads more closely than the Moody's model. For these reasons, the Bloomberg model is selected as the fundamental credit control, along with other controls, for the next phase of the analysis. In the previous analysis, the GLS and robust OLS models with Bloomberg had the most explanatory power. Additionally, the Bloomberg CDS spread variable was found to be statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level in the previous model. For these reasons, Bloomberg's model CDS spread variable was applied for part 2 of this paper. for these two models were so similar (see tables 3.1 and 3.2).
Graph 2.1: Bank Counts Grouped by Asset Size (U.S. dollars) (March 2014)
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate that, even when using the best credit and liquidity controls available, a model of banks' observed five-year CDS spreads is improved by using controls for a possible too-big-to-fail effect. We consider sequentially nine different possible too-big-to-fail control variables and each of them is significant at the 99 percent confidence level. The effect persists through different too-big-to-fail specifications, including the two G-SIB variables described previously, a linear asset size variable, various asset-size threshold variables, and a clearing bank dummy variable. In every instance, the too-big-to-fail coefficient is negative, indicating that greater size, being a G-SIB, or being a clearing bank results in lower observed five-year senior CDS spreads. This is broadly consistent with previous findings.
Although G-SIB includes asset size, it also reflects other factors, such as interconnectedness. One might imagine that as a multifaceted measure of systemic importance, it could better capture potential too-big-to-fail effects. However, when comparing G-SIB variables to the asset size variables, asset size has substantially greater descriptive power and economic significance than a bank's G-SIB status. For When looking at asset size, it appears as if the too-big-to-fail effect is more akin to a threshold effect than linear. The BIC is lower for nearly every size asset-threshold variable when compared to the linear size asset variable; which indicates greater descriptive power. Among the asset-size thresholds, the model suggests that the $50 billion asset threshold is the most economically significant (highest coefficient) cutoff while the $150 asset threshold is the most statistically significant (lowest BIC). Relative to a model with no too-big-to-fail variables, the BIC falls from 9,087 to 8,740 in the model with the inclusion of the $150 billion threshold (Table 3 .1). This implies a substantial improvement in the model's performance as a result of the inclusion of this asset-size threshold. The probability of the original specification being as strong as the specification including the $150 billion threshold variable is nearly zero (less than 0.0000001 percent). The inclusion of an additional dummy variable for clearing banks (shown in Table 3 .2) adjusts the economic significance of the asset-variable size slightly, but otherwise maintains the conclusion of Table 3 .1. It marginally improves the BIC of the Table 3 .1 shows the results of the GLS model using Bloomberg as a credit control variable and exploring a range of alternative variables, including G-SIB and asset size, meant to proxy for a too-big-to-fail effect. Table 3 .2 shows the results of the GLS model using Bloomberg as a credit control variable and exploring a range of alternative variables meant to proxy for a too-big-to-fail effect, including a clearing bank dummy variable in addition to G-SIB and asset-size variables explored previously.
Conclusion
This paper seeks to use the best available credit and liquidity controls to explain a sample of international banks' observed five-year single-name CDS spreads. In this regard, the paper uses both credit and liquidity control variables not previously used in the literature. Even with these more robust controls for credit and liquidity fundamentals, the best fit model still would include asset size as an explanatory variable for banks' observed CDS spreads. If credit fundamentals and liquidity differences are properly controlled for, it is not apparent, aside from a too-big-to-fail effect, why the asset size of a bank would strengthen the model.
12
The data suggest that models using nonlinear asset-size thresholds have the most economic and statistical significance. Banks perceived as too big to fail, based on asset-size thresholds, have CDS spreads 44 to 80 basis points lower than other banks. The study finds that the econometric models that use asset thresholds of $50 billion to $150 billion to indicate a too-big-to-fail effect have the best fits (both via R-squared in the OLS regressions and BIC in the GLS regressions) and largest too-big-to-fail coefficients (when checked for autocorrelation).
There have been calls from some policymakers to change the $50 billion Dodd-Frank Act threshold. Heightened prudential regulation for large firms presumably seeks, at least in part, to address market failure associated with lack of sufficient market discipline arising from investors' perceptions of too big to fail. This paper offers an analytic contribution on the question of size thresholds for heightened prudential regulation of large banks. We recognize that CDS spreads are but one way of considering this topic -systemic importance data, rating agency ratings uplift, and cross-sectional systemic risk metrics are other possible approaches.
